प्रकरण 4 — लखनौ करार

CHAPTER 4 LUCKNOW PACT

89. I am aware that my recommendations regarding the substitution of joint electorates for communal electorates and the distribution of seats conflict with the terms of the Lucknow Pact in so far as they affect the representation of the Mohamedan community. The representation of the Mohamedan community as settled under the rules framed in 1919 was largely based upon what is known as the Lucknow Pact. This pact embodies an agreement arrived at in 1917 at Lucknow between the Moslem League and the Congress, the former acting on behalf of the Mohamedans and the latter on behalf of the Hindus. It gave to the Mohamedans communal electorates and a varying proportion of seats in the Provincial and Central Legislature. I realise that the views I have put forth on the representation of the Mohamedan community are subversive of this agreement, and I feel that it is incumbent upon me to state why I think that this agreement should be scrapped.

90. My first argument is that the settlement embodied in the Lucknow Pact is wrong settlement. This was admitted by all the local governments. The Government of India in their Despatch reviewing the recommendations of the Franchise Committee to the Secretary of State, reported : “We note that local governments were not unanimous in subscribing to the compact. The Government of Madras framed their own proposals for Mohamedan representation without regard to it. The Bombay Government, while adopting the compact, did not rule out from discussion a scheme of representation upon a basis of population. The Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces was opposed to separate Mohamedan electorates and considered that the percentage proposed in the compact was ‘wholly disproportionate to the strength and standing of the community.’ The Chief Commissioner of Assam thought it was a mistake even from a Muslim point of view to give that community representation in excess of their numerical proportion.” Nor did the Government of India differ from this view generally held by the Provincial Governments. Evaluating the results of the Lucknow Pact in the different Provinces, they observed, “the result is that while Bengal Mohamedans get only three-quarters and the Punjab Mohamedans ninetenths of what they would receive upon a population basis, the Mohamedans of other Provinces have got good terms and some of them extravagantly good. We cannot ourselves feel that such a result represents the right relation either between Mohamedans in different Provinces, or between Mohamedans and the rest of the community”. Sir William Vincent, in a note of dissent, went so far as to say, “In my view……we should proceed without regard to the details of the Lucknow Settlement to fulfil our own pledges to the Mohamedans in what we ourselves think is the best way.”

91. The wrong in the Lucknow Pact is not so much that it treated the Mohamedans in the different Provinces in a dissimilar manner, providing for them generously in some and niggardly in others. This is comparatively speaking a small matter. The principal defect in the Lucknow Pact is that in allotting the seats to the Mohamedans it did not take into consideration the effect it will have upon other interests. The framers of the pact, as pointed out by the Government of India, failed to remember that whatever advantage is given to the Mohamedans is taken away from some other interest or interests. Sir William Vincent, too, was careful enough to point this out. He also said in his minute of dissent, “The compact meets with much more acceptance than criticism of the present time; but hereafter, when the value of votes and representation comes to be realised, it must be expected drat the interests which are hard hit by it will complain with some injustice that the Government of India should have endorsed it.” The extent to which this prediction has been realised is remarkable, and the universal dissatisfaction that is felt with the result of the Lucknow Pact is more than sufficient testimony to show that settlement embodied in the Lucknow Settlement is a wrong settlement. Now there can be nothing improper in asking that what is wrongly settled shall be re-settled. Such a demand is bound to meet with opposition from the Mohamedan community. Having obtained representation on an extravagant scale, they are sure to take their stand on precedent and past rights. But as Thomas Paine pointed out, the error of those who reason by precedents drawn from antiquity respecting their rights is that they would not take that time to the starting point when no vested rights existed. If they did they would realise that rights, far from being immutable, are historical accidents and are therefore liable to readjustment from time to time. This must be so, for all political and social progress is based upon the maxim that wrong cannot have a legal descent and that what is not rightly settled is never settled.

This is not the only instance in which a pact like the Lucknow Pact is sought to be revised. The Act of Union between Ireland and England was also a pact of the same sort. It certainly had a far greater binding force than the Lucknow Pact. In fact it was regarded as a treaty which guaranteed to Ireland 100 seats in Parliament. All the same, Mr. Balfour’s Government, when it found that the excessive representation granted to Ireland had become a positive wrong, did not hesitate to bring in a Bill in 1905 which would have had the effect of reducing the Irish seats by 30. That owing to the resignation of Mr. Balfour’s Government the Bill did not become law is another matter. But the fact remains that a revision of the Irish Settlement in the matter of the representation was not excluded by the fact that the settlement was based upon an agreement between the two parties. Nor was Mr. Balfour agreeable to the view that such revision could be carried out only with the consent of Ireland. Indeed, he had launched upon the scheme of redistribution in the teeth of the Irish opposition. But it is not necessary to go so far a field to find a precedent when there is one near at hand. The constitution of Ceylon had also given recognition to pacts and agreements between various organisations allowing communal representation and communal distribution of seats. But the Ceylon Commission of 1928 was emphatic in its view that “in any case, in considering afresh the whole problem of representation, private arrangements between races or groups, while worthy of attention, cannot take precedence of considerations in the interests of the Ceylon people as a whole.” It had therefore no hesitation in revising the whole scheme of representation in Ceylon out of recognition. What is asked herein is no more than what is done elsewhere.

92. It is further to be remembered that the Lucknow Pact is valueless not merely because its terms, to use the words of Government of India, “were the result rather of political negotiation than of deliberate reason,” but also because it was brought about by organisations neither of which had any real authority to speak in the name of those on whose behalf they purported to act. The All-India Muslim League was not entitled to speak for all Mohamedans, and that it was the view of the Government of India in their despatch on the Report of the Southborough Committee is abundantly clear. Regarding the Congress, it is indisputable that it is a body which does not represent the vast mass of the Non-Brahmins and the Depressed Classes. A pact arrived at by organisations which are not constituent assemblies of the mass of people may bind themselves, but they certainly cannot bind the generality of the people. To give the pact an authority as though it was treaty negotiated between duly empowered plenipotentiaries of different States is to assume in the League and the Congress an authority which they did not possess. It has become necessary to assess the binding force of the agreement because of the view taken by the Government of Bombay that, “Any change in the direction of abolishing separate electorates must, however, be based on agreement between the two communities, and cannot be forced on the Mohamedans against their wish. The question is also an All-India one and can hardly be dealt with on different lines for each Presidency. The Government of Bombay adhere to the view which they had expressed in 1916 that communal electorates are not acceptable to them and that their abolition is desirable, if it can be secured with the consent of both parties as in the case of the Lucknow Pact.” In my opinion this is an attitude which is as irresponsible as it is dangerous. It is irresponsible because it involves the surrender of the right of Parliament to decide in the matter. That the Government of India thought it wise not to “ignore” the pact, which in their opinion represented a genuine attempt on the part of the two communities upon so highly controversial a subject and “on behalf of the larger community at least a subordination of their immediate interests to the cause of unanimity and united political advance,” is true. But that is far from saying that the Government of India or any other authority held the view that on the question of Mohamedan representation their position was merely to register the decision which the Congress and the League may by mutual negotiations make. Indeed, Sir William Vincent was careful to point out that “in this matter (the Government of India) cannot delegate (its) responsibility to Parliament into other hands.”

93. The attitude taken by the Bombay Government is dangerous because, admitting that an error has been committed, it refuses to take upon itself the task of correcting it. I would have looked upon such an attitude as a pardonable sin if the error was not an error in the constitutional arrangement of the country. But unfortunately it is an error in the constitution, and, having found its lodgment in a most vital part thereof, it affects its working in a fatal manner. An error of such a character cannot be tolerated. A mistake in constitutional innovation directly affects the entire community and every part of it. It may be fraught with calamity or ruin, public or private, and correction is virtually impossible. The Government of Bombay practically takes for granted that all constitutional changes are final and must be submitted to, whatever their consequences. Doubtless this assumption arises from a fateful renunciation that in these matters we are propelled by an irresponsible force on a definite path towards an unavoidable end towards destruction. But I am glad to find that the Government of India in accepting the pact did not concede that its terms as embodied in the Act should stand unaltered. Far from leaving the matter shrouded in ambiguity, they made it quite clear that the arrangement was not to stand beyond the first Statutory Commission. In their Despatch on the Report of the South-borough Committee they said : “Before we deal in detail with the Report, one preliminary question of some importance suggests itself. As you will see, the work of the Committee has not to any great extent been directed towards the establishment of principles. In dealing with the various problems that came before them they have usually sought to arrive at agreement rather than to base their solutions upon general reasonings. It was no doubt the case that the exigencies of time alone made any other course difficult for them. But in dealing with their proposals, we have to ask ourselves the question whether the results of such methods are intended to be in any degree permanent…… Whatever be the machinery for alteration, however, we have to face the practical question of how long we intend the first electoral system set up in India to endure. Is it to be opened to reconstruction from the outset at the wish of the Provincial Legislature or is it to stand-unchanged at least until the first Statutory Commission ? There are reasons of some weight in either direction. In the interest of the growth of responsibility it is not desirable to stereotype the representation of the different interests in fixed proportion; the longer the separate class and communal constituencies remain set in a rigid mould, the harder it will become to progress towards normal methods of representation. On the other hand, it is by no means desirable to invite incessant struggle over their revision.” It is for the Commission to say whether the life of this error shall be prolonged. I have hopes that the Commission will not merely