7 साउथबरो समितीसमोरील साक्ष

EVIDENCE BEFORE THE SOUTHBOROUGH COMMITTEE ON FRANCHISE Examined on : 27th January 1919

From the Report of the Reforms Committee (Franchise) Vol. II, 1919

EVIDENCE BEFORE THE SOUTHBOROUGH COMMITTEE

The Committee was constituted as under : The Rt. Hon. Lord Southborough, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., G.C.M.C. (Chairman). Sir Frank G. Sly, K.C.S.I., I.C.S. Sahibzada Aftab Ahmed Khan.

The Hon’ble Babu Surendranath Banerjea. The Hon’ble Mr. M. N. Hogg.

W. M. Hailey, Esq., C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S. The Hon’ble Mr. Srinivasa Sastri (Not present on 25-1-1919 and 27-1-1919). And the following added members : L. C. Crump, Esq., I.C.S.

K. Natarajan, Esq.

P. C. Tallents, Esq., I.C.S. ( Secretary).

EVIDENCE BEFORE THE SOUTHBOROUGH COMMITTEE WRITTEN STATEMENT

“The most difficult and the most momentous question of Government (is) how to transmit the force of individual opinion and preference into public action. This is the crux of popular institutions.” So says Professor A.B. Hart. But this is only half the definition of popular Government. It is therefore necessary to emphasize the other half which is equal if not more in importance. As the Government is the most important field for the exercise of individual capacities, it is in the interest of the people that no person as such should be denied the opportunity of actively participating in the process of Government. That is to say popular Government is not only Government for the people but by the people. To express the same in a different way, representation of opinions by itself is not sufficient to constitute popular Government. To cover its true meaning it requires personal representation as well. It is because the former is often found without the latter that the Franchise Committee has to see in devising the franchises and constituencies for a popular Government in India, it provides for both, i.e., representation of opinions and representation of persons. Any scheme of franchise and constituency that fails to bring this about fails to create a popular Government.

2. Success in this task will ultimately depend upon the accuracy of the de facto conception of the society which is to be given the popular form of Government. De facto India was well portrayed by Lord Dufferin when he described it as a ...

“Population . . . composed of a large number of distinct nationalities, professing various religions, practising diverse rites, speaking different languages, while many of them ... still further separated from one another by discordant prejudices, by conflicting sources of usages, and even antagonistic material interests. But perhaps the most patent characteristic of our Indian cosmos is its division into two mighty political communities as distant from each other as the poles apart—On the one hand the Hindus—with their elaborate caste distinctions—on the other hand, the Mohammedans—with their social equality. To these must be added a host of minor nationalities most of them numbering millions—almost as widely differentiated from one another by ethnological or political distinctions as are the Hindus from the Mohammedans, such as Sikhs, with their warlike habits and traditions and their enthusiastic religious beliefs, the Rohillas, the Pathans, the Assamese, the Baluchis and other wild and martial tribes on our frontiers, the hillmen dwelling in the folds of the Himalayas, our subjects in Burma, Mongol in race and Buddhist in religion, the Gonds, Mhars, Bheels and other nonAryan people in the centre and south of India, and the enterprising Parsees, with their rapidly developing manufactures and commercial interests. Again, amongst these numerous communities may be found, at one and the same moment, all the various stages of civilization through which mankind has passed from the pre-historic ages to the present days.”

3. Englishmen have all along insisted that India is unfit for representative Government because of the division of her population into castes and creeds. This does not carry conviction with the advanced wing of Indian politicians. When they say that there are also social divisions in Europe as there are in India they are amply supported by facts. The social divisions of India are equalled, if not outdone, in a country like the United States of America. Corresponding to those in the former, we have in the latter men bonded together in a criminal conspiracy and trust or combinations that prey upon the public. Not only are there political sub-divisions but also industrial, scientific, and religious associations, differing in their aims and their attitudes towards each other. Apart from political parties with diverse ends, social sets, cliques and gangs we find in the United States of America more permanent divisions of the population such as the Poles, Dutch, Swedes, Germans, Russians, etc., each with its own language, religious and moral codes and traditions. If social divisions unfit a country for representative Government, it should unfit the United States of America as much as India. But if with all the social divisions, the United States of America is fit for representative Government, why not India ? Ask the Indian politicians, so entrenched, it is difficult to dislodge them, and show that the social divisions of India are of a different kind or grant them their contention. Without these two there is no third alternative possible.

4. In my opinion their contention cannot be granted for the social divisions of India do matter in politics. How they matter can be best shown by understanding when they don’t matter. Men live in a community by virtue of the things they have in common. What they must have in common in order to form a community are aims, beliefs, aspirations, knowledge,

a common understanding ; or to use the language of the Sociologists, they must be like-minded. But how do they come to have these things in common or how do they become like-minded ? Certainly, not by sharing with another as one would do in the case of a piece of cake. To cultivate an attitude similar to others or to be like-minded with others is to be in communication with them or to participate in their activity. Persons do not become like-minded by merely living in physical proximity, any more than they cease to be like-minded by being distant from each other. Participation in a group is the only way of being like-minded with the group. Each group tends to create its own distinctive type of like-mindedness, but where there are more groups than one to be brought into political union, there would be conflict among the differently like-minded. And so long as the groups remain isolated the conflict is bound to continue and prevent the harmony of action. It is the isolation of the groups that is the chief evil. Where the groups allow of endosmosis they cease to be evil. For endosmosis among the groups makes possible a resocialization of once socialized attitudes. In place of the old, it creates a new like-mindedness, which is representative of the interests, aims, and aspirations of all the various groups concerned. Like-mindedness is essential for an harmonious life, social or political and, as has just been shown, it depends upon the extent of communication, participation or endosmosis. Applying this test to the divisions in India, we must pronounce upon them as constituting an obstacle in the path of realizing an harmonious political life.

5. The groups or divisions each with its set like-mindedness that are sure to be in conflict may be given as follows :

(1) Hindus;

(2) Mohammedans ;

(3) Christians ;

(4) Parsees;

(5) Jews, etc.

Except the Hindus the rest of the divisions are marked by such complete freedom of communication from within that we may expect their members to be perfectly like-minded with respect to one another. Regarding the Hindus, however, the analysis must be carried on a little farther. The significant fact about the Hindus is that before they are Hindus they are members of some caste. The castes are so exclusive and isolated that the consciousness of being a Hindu would be the chief guide of a Hindu’s activity towards non-Hindu. But as against a Hindu of a different caste his caste-consciousness would be the chief guide of activity. From this, it is plain that as between two Hindus, caste-like-mindedness is more powerful than the like-mindedness due to their both being Hindus. Thus from within the Hindus, as from without, there is likely to be a conflict of like-minded persons. There are some who argue that this conflict runs through the whole gamut of the caste system. But this is protesting too much. From the point of view of communication the Hindus, in spite of castes, divide themselves into two significant groups—the touchables and the untouchables. The touchables have enough communication between them to enable us to say that the conflict of like-mindedness so far as they are concerned is not much to be dreaded. But there is a real difference and consequent conflict between the like-mindedness of the touchables and the untouchables. Untouchability is the strongest ban on the endosmosis between them. Their complete isolation accounts for the acuteness of the difference of like-mindedness. The real social divisions of India then are :

(1) Touchable Hindus.

(2) Untouchable Hindus.

(3) Mohammedans.

(4) Christians.

(5) Parsees.

(6) Jews.

6. It will not do good to ignore these real divisions in devising a system of policy, if the policy is to take the form of popular Government. But if the success of popular Government depends upon how well the constituencies and franchises transmit the social forces and how well they secure personal representation ; we must first study the form which the conflict between these groups will assume in an election.

7. In a territorial constituency, which will group together voters belonging to the above groups, a majority of votes will declare a candidate to be a representative for the constituency in question. Now the question arises : is such a candidate, a true representative of the groups, covered by the territorial constituency ? Is he a true mirror of the mind of the constituency ? Is he a representative of all the interests in the constituency ? To be concrete, will a Hindu candidate represent Mohammedan interests ? At this stage it must be recalled that the various divisions described above are held together by a community of interests which are non-secular or purely religious. We cannot say that each division is held together by a community of interests which are secular or material. If so, then for secular purposes the groups will be broken up. From the point of view of material interests, there are no such people as Mohammedans, Parsees, Hindus, etc. There will be in each of these groups landlords, labourers, capitalists, free traders, protectionists, etc., each of the groups having community of interests which are material will be composed of Hindus, Mohammedans, Parsees, etc. Consequently, a Hindu candidate can very well represent the material interests of the Mohammedans and vice versa. There is thus no conflict of material interest in the main among the communities as such. If we suppose that religious interests in future will occupy a subordinate place in the affairs of men, the secular interests of a group can be well represented by a candidate from another group.

8. From this point of view a territorial constituency will be sufficient for a popular Government. A little more consideration will show that it will be sufficient for only one-half the definition of popular Government. How true it is, will be shown presently. In an electoral fight between the various groups in a territorial constituency the voters will discriminate in favour of a candidate with whom they are in sympathy. But with whom they will be in sympathy is determined for them in advance. Given two candidates belonging to different groups but purporting to represent the same interest, the voters will mark their votes on the person belonging to the same community. Any group yielding a large number of electors will have its own candidate elected. This discrimination on the part of the voters, though it may not leave unrepresented the interests of the members of the minor groups, leaves them without any chance of personal representation.

9. To those who are busy in devising schemes for the proper and adequate representation of interests and opinions dilating on the importance of personal representation is likely to seem idle. But personal representation is not therefore unimportant. In recent times “Government for the people” has claimed more attention than “Government by the people”. In fact there are instances to show that “Government for the people” can exist in the best sense of the phrase without there being a “Government by the people.” Yet all political theorists will unanimously condemn such a form of Government. And the why of it is important to know. It will be granted that each kind of association, as it is an educative environment, exercises a formative influence on the active dispositions of its members. Consequently, what one is as a person is what one is as associated with others. A Government for the people, but not by the people, is sure to educate some into masters and others into subjects; because it is by the reflex effects of association that one can feel and measure the growth of personality. The growth of personality is the highest aim of society. Social arrangement must secure free initiative and opportunity to every individual to assume any role he is capable of assuming provided it is socially desirable. A new rule is a renewal and growth of personality. But when an association—and a Government is after all an association—is such that in it every role cannot be assumed by all, it tends to develop the personality of the few at the cost of the many—a result scrupulously to be avoided in the interest of Democracy. To be specific, it is not enough to be electors only. It is necessary to be law-makers ; otherwise who can be law-makers will be masters of those who can only be electors.

10. Territorial constituencies are therefore objected to, and rightly, on the ground that they do nothing to prevent this absurd outcome. They erroneously suppose that electors will vote on the programmes of the

candidates without any regard for their persona. As a matter of fact, the electors before they are electors are primarily members of a group. The persona of the candidates does matter with them. Naturally, therefore, as members of a group they prefer the candidate who belongs to their group to another candidate who does not belong to their group though both of them claim to represent the same interest. As a result of this preference the electors of a large group are destined to rise to a higher position of becoming eventual law-makers, while the electors of a smaller group for no fault of theirs are doomed to a lower position of remaining electors. One crux of popular Government is the representation of interests and opinions. The other crux is personal representation. Territorial constituencies fail to create popular Government because they fail to secure personal representation to members of minor groups.

11. If this is a correct analysis as to how the social divisions operate to the prejudice of the political life of some communities, never was a more improper remedy advocated to meet the situation than proportional representation. Proportional representation is intended to give proportionate representation to views. It presupposes that voters vote for a candidate because of his views and not because of his persona. Proportional representation is ill-suited for the purpose in hand.

12. We have therefore two possible methods of meeting the situation : either to reserve seats in plural constituencies for those minorities that cannot otherwise secure personal representation or grant communal electorates. Both have their usefulness. So far as the representation of the Mohammedans is concerned, it is highly desirable that they should participate in a general election with seats reserved for them in plural constituencies. The angularity of the division that separates the Hindus and Mohammedans is already sharp and communal representation, it may be urged, sharpens it the more. Communal election, however, seems to be a settled fact, so far as the Mohammedans are concerned and nothing is likely to alter it, even though alteration is likely to be beneficial.

13. But this argument is mainly intended to concern itself with the representation of the Hindus in general, and of the untouchable Hindus in particular. The discussion of the representation of the Hindus may be best introduced by a quotation which expresses the newer consciousness that has arisen in the various Hindu groups. It is said :

“A community may claim representation only on the ground of separate interests which require protection. In India, such interests are of three kinds only : either they arise out of religious antipathies which are pretty strong in India, or out of the backward state of a community in educational matters, or out of the socioreligious disabilities to which a community may be subject. Confining ourselves to the Hindu communities there are certain communities who, besides being very backward, are suffering under a great social tyranny. The untouchable classes must have their own men in the Council Hall to fight for the redress of their grievances. The non-Brahmins as a class are subjected to the social and intellectual domination of the Brahmin priesthood and may therefore rightly advocate separate representation.”

14. From this it will be seen that the new consciousness among the Hindus while acknowledging the separate interests of the untouchables does not accept the position that the touchable Hindus form a group by themselves. The new consciousness insists on dividing the touchable group into Brahmins and non-Brahmins each with its own separate interests. Separate electorates or reserved seats in mixed electorates are demanded for the three groups in which the Hindus are divided. Before dealing with the problems of the representation of the untouchables something will be said on the question of the Brahmins and non-Brahmins.

15. That the non-Brahmins are “backward in educational matters” cannot be said in any way to be their special interest. It is the general interest of all even of those Brahmins who are educationally backward. “The intellectual and social domination of the Brahmins” is not a matter that affects the non-Brahmins alone. It affects all and it is therefore the interest of all. What remains then as a special interest for the non-Brahmins to require their protection ?

The case for separate representation for non-Brahmins fails because they cannot prove to have a common non-Brahmin interest.

16. But do they fail to secure personal representation ? This can be best shown by reference to figures— Group I Group II Caste of Local Board voters No. of voters for the Local Boards of the districts of Belgaum, Bijapur and Dharwar 2 Total population of the three districts No. of voters for the Local Boards of the districts of Ratnagiri and Kolaba Total population of the two districts 1 2 345 Brahmins . . 4,600 85,739 4,477 89,786 Lingayats . . 12,730 933,123 . . . . . . . .

Marathas . . 1,074 255,526 3,667 446,077 Mahars . . 22 196,751 33 138,738 Mohammedans . . 661 295,838 1,169 106,273 Others . . 4,241 1,065,821 2,837 1,016,930 Total . . 23,328 2,832,798 12,183 1,797,804 Reducing the above figures to the basis of a thousand we have the following interesting result :

Group I Group II Names of Castes Propor tion of popula tion of a caste to every thousand of the popula tion covered Propor- tion of voters of a caste to every thousand of the popula tion of the same caste Propor- tion of voters of a caste to every thousand of voters Propor- tion of popula- tion of a caste to every thousand of the popula- tion covered Propor- tion of voters of a caste to every thousand of the popula- tion of the same caste Propor- tion of voters of a caste to every thousand of voters 1 2 3 4 5 67 Brahmins . . 30.2 53.7 197.2 50.8 49.8 367.4 Lingayats . . 329.4 13.6 545.7 . . . . . . . . . . . . Marathas . . 90.2 4.2 46.0 248.8 8.2 300.9 Mahars . . 69.5 0.1 0.9 74.5 0.2 2.7 Mohammedans . . 104.4 2.2 28.3 59.2 10.9 95.9 Others . . 376.2 3.9 181.3 562.2 2.8 232.8 So arranged, the conclusions to be drawn from these figures are highly important.

(1) The Brahmins, given a uniform franchise for all, though a small minority so far as numbers are concerned becomes a majority so far as the total of voters is concerned as is the case in Group II. (2) Though with an uniform franchise the non-Brahmin communities like the Lingayats and Marathas do not fail to figure on the voters’ list, the proportion of their voters to their population is insignificant as compared with the proportion which the Brahmin voters bear to the Brahmin population.

17. The proportion of the Brahmins to their voters is really extravagant. It is justified neither by faith in them nor by their own numbers. The Lingayats though they can legitimately complain that the proportion of their voters is small will succeed in securing personal representation. The Marathas though larger in numbers than the Brahmins, besides the very small proportion of their voters suffer on the voters’ list and very likely will fail to secure personal representation for themselves.

So argued, the case for special provision of the Marathas can be sustained and should be admitted.

18. The question is in what form the provision should take. In my opinion such provision instead of taking the form of separate electorates of reserved seats should take the form of a low pitched franchise. The franchise for the non-Brahmin should be lower than that for the Brahmin. By this arrangement the Marathas would improve their position on the voters’ list and the altogether favoured position of the Brahmin would be equalized. It is in the interest of all that the Brahmin should not play such a preponderant part in politics as he has been doing hitherto. He has exerted a pernicious influence on the social life of the country and it is in the interest of all that his pernicious influence should be kept at a minimum in politics. As he is the most exclusive he is most anti-social.

19. Even the authors of the report on constitutional reforms are not in favour of a limited or uniform franchise. They say, “We consider that the limitations of the franchise, which it is obviously desirable to make as broad as possible, should be determined rather with reference to practical difficulties than to any prior considerations as to the degree of education or amount of income which may be held to constitute a qualification. It is possible that owing to unequal distribution of population and wealth it may be necessary to differentiate the qualifications for a vote not merely between provinces, but between different parts of the same province” (P. 147) To this I should like to add that we should differentiate the qualifications for a vote not merely between provinces or parts thereof but between communities of the same province. Without this differentiation some communities with a small but wealthy or educated population will secure more votes than a large community consisting of poor and uneducated members. Uniformity in franchise should be dispensed with. An important result will be that communal representation or reservation of seats for some non-Brahmin communities who are now clamouring for it would be avoided.

20. The untouchables are usually regarded as objects of pity but they are ignored in any political scheme on the score that they have no interests to protect. And yet their interests are the greatest. Not that they have large property to protect from confiscation. But they have their very persona confiscated. The socio religious disabilities have dehumanized the untouchables and their interests at stake are therefore the interests of humanity. The interests of property are nothing before such primary interests.

21. If one agrees with the definition of slave as given by Plato, who defines him as one who accepts from another the purposes which control his conduct, the untouchables are really slaves. The untouchables are so socialized as never to complain of their low estate. Still less do they ever dream of trying to improve their lot, by forcing the other classes to treat

them with that common respect which one man owes to another. The idea that they have been born to their lot is so ingrained in their mind that it never occurs to them to think that their fate is anything but irrevocable. Nothing will ever persuade them that men are all made of the same clay, or that they have the right to insist on better treatment than that meted out to them.

22. The exact description of the treatment cannot be attempted. The word untouchable is an epitome of their ills and sufferings. Not only has untouchability arrested the growth of their personality but also it comes in the way of their material well-being. It has also deprived them of certain civil rights. For instance, in Konkan the untouchables are prohibited from using the public road. If some high caste man happens to cross him, he has to be out of the way and stand at such a distance that his shadow will not fall on the high caste man. The untouchable is not even a citizen. Citizen ship is a bundle of rights such as (1) personal liberty, (2) personal security, (3) rights to hold private property, (4) equality before law, (5) liberty of conscience, (6) freedom of opinion and speech, (7) right of assembly, (8) right of representation in a country’s Government and (9) right to hold office under the State. The British Government by gradual growth may be said to have conceded these rights at least in theory to its Indian subjects. The right of representation and the right to hold office under the State are the two most important rights that make up citizenship. But the untouchability of the untouchables puts these rights far beyond their reach. In a few places they do not even possess such insignificant rights as personal liberty and personal security, and equality before law is not always assured to them. These are the interests of the untouchables. And as can be easily seen they can be represented by the untouchables alone. They are distinctively their own interests and none else can truly voice them. A free trade interest can be voiced by a Brahmin, a Mohammedan or a Maratha equally well. But none of these can speak for the interests of the untouchables because they are not untouchables. Untouchability constitutes a definite set of interests which the untouchables alone can speak for. Hence it is evident that we must find the untouchables to represent their grievances which are their interests and, secondly, we must find them in such numbers as will constitute a force sufficient to claim redress.

23. Now, will a general territorial electorate provided for the adequate return of the untouchables to the law-making body ? Referring back to the figures we find that the untouchables (represented in the table by the Mahars), though they formed 69.4 in every thousand of the population, did not claim even a voter from their class. Under such circumstances it is impossible for them to elect their own man in a general electorate. On the other hand they must despair of any votes being cast by the touchable Hindus for an untouchable candidate. The gradation of castes produces a certain theological basis which cuts the untouchables both ways : in the minds of the lower orders it creates a preference for the higher orders while it creates a contempt for the lower orders in the minds of the higher orders. Thus the ascending scale of preference and the descending scale of hatred and contempt beggars the untouchables both ways. Without giving a single vote to the untouchables the touchables are sure to make a large draft on the already meagre voting strength of the untouchables.

24. So situated, the untouchables with the largest interests at stake will be the greatest sufferers in a general territorial electorate. To give them an opening, special provision shall have to be made for their adequate representation. But before a scheme can be outlined it is necessary to see how much is the untouchable population in the Bombay Presidency. The Census Report for the Bombay Presidency for the year 1911 gives the following figures for castes which “cause pollution” : Bhungis . . . . . . . . 93,691 Chamars Mochis . . . . . . . . 306,478 Machigars Sochis Mhars . . . . . . . . 1,470,992 Holiyas Dheds Mangs . . . . . . . . 274,037 Madigs Total . . 2,145,193 To this must be added the . .

Dhors amounting to . . . . . . 13,506 Total Untouchables . . 2,158,699 The following figures give the distribution of the untouchables by districts : District Total population 1911 Total Hindu population Total untouchable Population Percentage of untouchables to the total population Percentage of untouchables to the Hindu population 1 2 3 45 6 British Districts (excluding Aden).

19,628,477 14,920,267 1,627,980 8 10.9

1. Bombay City . . 979,445 664,042 89,052 9 11.6 Northern Division . . 3,685,383 3,117,263 245,050 6.6 7.8

2. Ahmedabad . . 827,809 693,155 78,869 10 11.4

3. Broach . . 306,717 192,935 22,390 7 11.6

1 234 56

4. Kaira . . 691,744 598,164 41,497 5.9 6.9

5. Panch Mahals . . 332,695 274,339 14,410 4 5

6. Surat . . 654,109 571,745 36,509 5.6 6

7. Thana . . 882,309 786,925 50,010 5.6 6 Central Division . . 6,387,064 5,993,828 7,73,184 12 13

8. Ahmednagar . . 945,305 855,676 116,929 12 13.6

9. Khandesh (East) . . 1,034,886 902,131 112,391 10.8 12

10. Khandesh (West) . . 580,723 474,200 36,809 6 7.7

11. Nasik . . 905,030 843,705 97,740 10.7 11

12. Poona . . 1,071,512 991,725 113.118 12.4 13.3

13. Satara . . 1,081,278 1,028,176 144,688 13 14

14. Sholapur . . 768,330 703,215 129,063 16.7 18 Southern Division . . 5,061,150 4,502,708 385,470 7.6 8.5

15. Belgaum . . 943,820 817,797 83,199 8.8 10.1

16. Bijapur . . 862,973 757,542 80,501 9 10.6

17. Dharwar . . 1,026,005 872,885 52,540 5 6

18. Kanara . . 430,548 383,624 10,767 2.4 2.9

19. Kolaba . . 594,156 560,266 51,108 8.5 9.1

20. Ratnagiri . . 1,203,638 1,110,594 107,354 8.9 9.7 Sind (British Districts)

. . 3,513,435 837,426 135,224 3.8 16

25. The total population of the Bombay Presidency by the Census of 1911 (British districts only) is 19,626,477. Of this the untouchable population is 1,627,980 or 8 per cent of the total. Assuming for the present the Bombay Legislative Council to consist of 100 elected members, the untouchables should have 8 representatives to represent them in the Council. If we distribute one representative to every 200,000 of the people (which is just the ratio of 100 representatives to the 20 millions of the population), then the untouchables can by right claim 8 representatives to themselves. But the untouchables of the Bombay Presidency may be allowed to elect 9 members in all. The election of one additional member will be justified later on.

26. Allowing them to elect 9 members, the constituencies which are to elect them should be as follows:

1. The various districts of the Presidency except the City of Bombay and the Province of Sind should be grouped together on a linguistic basis as follows:

I. Gujarathi-speaking districts II. Marathi-speaking districts III. Kanarese-speaking districts

1. Ahmedabad . . . . 78,969 1. Thana . . . . 50,010 1. Dharwar . . . . 52,540

2. Broach . . . . 22,390 2. Kolaba . . . . 51,108 2. Bijapur . . . . 80,503

3. Kaira . . . . 41,497 3. Ratnagiri . . . . 107,354 3. Belgaum . . . . 83,199

4. Panch Mahals . . 14,410 4. Ahmednagar . . . . 116,929 4. Kanara . . . . 10,758

5. Surat . . . . 36,509 5. Khandesh West . . . . 36,809

6. Khandesh East. . . . . 112,391

7. Satara . . . . 144,738

8. Poona . . . . 148,118

9. Nasik . . . . 96,740

10. Sholapur . . . . 129,063

27. The following should be the constituencies of the untouchables and the number of representatives which each constituency should elect:

Language District Population in each district Population in each constituency Number of the constituency Number of representatives to be elected by the constituency 1 2 3 4 5 6 Bombay City . . 89,052 89,052 I 1

1. Ahmedabad . . 78,869

2. Broach . . 22,390 I. Gujarathi 3. Kaira . . 41,497 193,675 II 1

4. Panch Mahals . . 14,410

5. Surat . . 36,509

1. Thana . . 50,010

2. Kolaba . . 51,108 208,472 III 1

3. Ratnagiri . . 107,354

4. Ahmednagar . . 116,929 II. Marathi 5. Khandesh East . . 112.391 363,869 IV 2

6. Khandesh West . . 36,809

7. Nasik . . 97,740

8. Satara . . 144,688

9. Poona . . 133,118 406,869 V 2

10. Sholapur . . 129,063

1. Belgaum . . 83,199

2. Bijapur . . 80,501 227,007 VI III. Kanarese 3. Dharwar . . 52,540

4. Kanara . . 10,767 Sind . . 135,224 135,224 VII 1 Total number of representatives to be elected by the untouchables of the Presidency.